Social Movement Theory.
NB These notes go into some theoretical depth… Less academically-inclined
readers might want to go straight to the notes on each movement (via Contents
Page).
Links:
These
notes continue those at social movements introduction which cover:
1. Theory of (new) social movements:
2. Definitions and General Issues:
(a)
General definition.
(b)
When did “social movements” arrive on the scene?
(c) The
self-production of society.
Notes below:
3.
Typologies and classifications:
(a) Aberle: transformative, reformative, redemptive, alterative
(b) Della Porta - general points, classifications:
(i) collective behaviour
(ii) resource mobilisation
(iii) Political
Process
(iv) New social movements
4. Relation
of social movements to politics
5. Other
theories and issues
(i) Salomon & opposition to social movements
(ii) Carl
Boggs
(iii) Park
(iv) Castoriadis
Footnote on
Marxism and structural-functionalism.
3.
Typologies and classifications of social movements:
(a) An early
attempt to classify social movements, mainly by differentiating between their
aims, was that of Aberle (1966):
(i) Transformative – setting out to transform society,
or seeking far-reaching changes. Examples of such movements are revolutionary
movements, radical religious movements e.g. millenarian movements already
mentioned.
(ii) Reformative: having more
limited objectives, aiming to right specific "injustices" e.g.
anti-abortion movement.
The next two categories deal more
with changes in individuals:
(iii)
Redemptive: to rescue people from wrong
ways of life, from sin etc, e.g. Pentecostal sects.
(iv)
Alterative: to bring
about (partial) change in individuals e.g. Alcoholics Anonymous.
Comment:
This does not seem an ideal way
of distinguishing between different movements, for several reasons:
(i) the heading “transformative” is too broad, bringing together
very different kinds of organisation (though some might argue that
revolutionary political groups are not dissimilar to religious groups!
Nevertheless I believe there are important differences);
(ii) “redemptive”
seems appropriate for religions rather than for social movements;
(iii) and
I am not sure why the last two categories, including organisations such as
Alcoholics Anonymous, are put in the same overall category as social movements
at all!
(iv) Other movements, such as anti-colonial movements,
women, youth, don’t seem to fit into these headings.
(b) A more
recent, and thorough, study is that of Della Porta
(1999):
(i) Marxist and non-Marxist theories:
First she makes the general point
that the dominant social theories in the latter part of the 20th
century were, firstly: Marxism and neo-Marxism (especially in Europe), and
secondly: (a non- Marxist view) structural-functionalism (especially in the US.
e.g. Neil Smelser, 1962) (* see footnote).
However, the (“new”) social
movements that occurred in the 1960s took most social theorists (Marxist and
non- Marxist) by surprise, as they didn’t seem to fit existing theories: they
were not proletarian-based (as Marxists would have expected) and as far as
functionalists were concerned they didn’t have a “function” i.e. they didn’t
contribute to the maintenance or updating of the system. (For some
functionalists they were almost “pathological”!).
The two broad types of theory
then came up with different analyses of social movements. In the USA theories
drawing on structural functionalism still dominated, whilst in Europe
Marxist-derived theory was more widespread.
Of course, it has to be borne in
mind that in each part of the world the movements themselves were rather
different, and this may go part of the way to explain the dominance of the
different theories. For example, in the USA, many of the mid-20th
century movements were interest groups, often religious and tending to be
pragmatic – seeking specific changes. On the other hand, in Europe – where the
labour movement had been stronger – there was more emphasis on ideological
conflict and a critique of “the system”.
When structural functionalists
analysed social movements more closely they came up with the following
classification (it is worth noting that all these accounts are mainly concerned
with the question of "how" social movements act, rather than “why”
they arise):
(ii) “collective behaviour” approach:
Ever since the 19th
century, and the French Revolution, people have tried to understand the
seemingly odd behaviour of crowds and mobs. Gustave
Le Bon was one of the first writers to describe “crowd behaviour”, and it is
often the case that writers dealing with “collective behaviour” will regard it
as irrational, or easily getting out of control. Even Marx, whilst
advocating revolutionary uprising, made a distinction (to be refined by Lenin)
between a “lumpen” proletariat which was liable to
riot without clear goals, and the disciplined and organised working class.
This approach emphasises the reaction
by people at large to conditions in which there is a “strain” on the social
system. For example, Smelser (1962) suggests that
over-rapid social transformation (e.g. economic change,
or changes in social status, or fragmentation of family ties because of mass
society) will have side-effects in terms of collective behaviour. In
particular, people will become uncertain of the “meaning” of the social order,
as social and cultural change takes place. For example, it was once seen
as valuable to be “in service” – then gradually some of the tasks carried out
by the servant class were taken over by machines, other tasks simply
disappeared, and a whole class and social outlook had changed; similarly, we
used to talk of the “dignity of labour” – but not many manual workers are seen
in this way now. There is here a strong emphasis on the spread of beliefs, and
on the potential for change arising from cultural aspects of a society. (As
opposed to hard-line Marxists who believe that culture is secondary to the
social structure and the conditions of production).
So these strains on the social
system, this questioning and uncertainty, create tensions which the society’s
"homeostatic rebalancing mechanisms cannot, temporarily, absorb" and
this can lead to
"crisis behaviour". Note that no judgement is being
made about the desirability of the changes in question: these are simply noted,
and what is important is how people react to them. To illustrate the way that
this “collective behaviour” is modelled on individuals’ psychology, and tends
to make judgements about “rational” and “irrational” behaviour, we might note
that Smelser talks of how, in times of crisis,
isolated and less intellectual individuals become susceptible to appeals of the
extreme political left or right. But note also the way that Smelser
seems to dismiss certain attitudes as “extreme”, and assumes the “far left” or
“far right” to be appealing only to people who are not thinking properly!
Della Porta
(1999) points to the limitations of this approach, as she says that it “reduces collective phenomena to sum of individual
behaviours”. She would argue that collective behaviour is more than the sum of
individual behaviours, and that it is not always irrational. Surely sometimes
feelings of frustration, deprivation aggression etc. are fully justified if
people are being forced to accept change they don’t want. Giddens
(1989) also questions whether it is true that social movements occur only as
reactions or responses to other events or crises.
On the other hand there is some
value in Smelser’s theory, in that, as Giddens (1989, p 626) summarises it, there is an attempt to
work out a methodical analysis of social processes that might lead to social
movements. According to Smelser there are six
conditions that need to be in place before a situation arises which will lead to mass action:
1. Structural conduciveness:
the social structure must leave room for change – e.g. in the United States,
there is no or little state regulation in some areas (e.g. religion), thus
leaving room for groups to propose changes. On the other hand, presumably a
rigid, totalitarian social order that is not open to protest or change, is not
likely to allow social movements to arise.
2. Structural strain: some
tensions, conflicts of interest, must exist which test the limits of the
system.
3. Generalized beliefs: as
noted, what people believe and expect is fundamental to social stability or
instability, and when social movements arise they are accompanied by widespread
new ideas or ideologies.
4. Precipitating factors:
something – an immediate cause or event, as distinct from an underlying cause -
that will “tip the balance”. Giddens gives the instance
of Rosa Parks (a black woman) refusing to move from a “white” area of a bus,
which led to the growth of the civil rights movement in the USA.
5. Co-ordinated group: to
turn the above into a movement, as distinct from uncoordinated protests, rioting
etc, there must be organisation i.e. leadership, resources, regular
communication between individuals etc.
6. How a
social movement develops is influenced by the operation of social control:
how governing authorities respond. It would be natural for the power-holders to
try to prevent “trouble” from the discontented masses, so there will be
attempts to impose social order from above – these imposed constraints are
bound to lead to a reaction by the people affected “below”.
It is possible to suggest (as
does Della Porta) that this theory can be refined
(and might be able better to address the question of how individual behaviours
become collective action) by drawing on what sociologists call “symbolic interactionism”. As noted above, Bottomore
comes close to this when he talks of the “self-production” of modern societies.
However, Smelser’s particular point is that movements may arise where there is
a co-existence of groups with contrasting value-systems.
Finally, the main weaknesses in
the “collective behaviour” approach are:
- that it tends put together
crowds, movements, panic, manias and fashions etc, as well as revolutions,
which are surely different from each other?
- it stresses
reactive behaviour, when some social
movements are proactive,
- it
also tends to focus on unexpected and irrational behaviour, when those
participating would see their action as rational,
- nor,
as noted, does it adequately explain the causes of the growth of some social
movements and not others.
(iii) “resource mobilisation”:
This approach, typified by Charles Tilly
(e.g. 1978), runs counter to the idea that collective movements are irrational,
and a product of malfunctions of the social system.
For Tilly and others, collective movements are
simply an extension of conventional political behaviour. Hence it is stressed
that social movements act in a more or less organised way to mobilise
resources; it is also possible to identify individuals with expertise and
organising or campaigning skills – what some call “movement entrepreneurs” who
play a key role in social movements. (Today the example of Jonathan Porritt might come most readily to mind!)
This is a useful approach, as it
then entails looking at such things as the obstacles and incentives to
collective action; what links are formed with which allies; the costs
and benefits of participation in social movements; and of course the way
that established political institutions react to the challenges of social
movements.
Here a central question is to go
beyond identifying discontent etc, to explaining how this gets transformed into
mobilisation. It will be found then that this depends on a variety of material
and other resources: work, money, benefits, services, and
individuals’ authority, moral engagement, faith, friendship etc. Moreover,
in a social movement, these will be distributed in a rational way across
different activities and objectives – we might even be able to apply cost/benefit
analysis to the activities of the movement! Such an approach also highlights
the need for ways of networking, sharing incentives, reducing
costs of action etc.
Whilst
recognising the value of this approach, it can also be said that it does not deal
with the structural sources of conflict. There is also bound to be more
emphasis on process, and less on the specific stakes and goals
for which action has been mobilised. Some would criticise the notion of
movement entrepreneurs, and stress the popular self-activity that is
characteristic of social movements. (Doesn’t a movement become
institutionalised when its leaders/organisers are household names?)
Finally,
this approach is subject to the opposite criticism to that made of the
collective behaviour approach: i.e. is it not the case that not all collective
action is rational, or only rational - what is the
part played by the emotions in collective behaviour?
(iv) “political process”:
This approach sees social
movements as not very different from other activities within the realm of
“politics”: social movements form because there exist
interests that lack other means of representation. Such movements can therefore
cause conflict within the system.
This approach then focuses on the
political and institutional environment in which movements occur, &
examines the relationship between this environment and the protesting movement.
One particularly useful concept that has been formulated by this approach is
that of the “political opportunity structure” (Della Porta
cites Peter Eisinger 1973) – that is, the local
political system can be “open” to new claims, creating opportunities for
change, or it can be closed, in which case there will be a greater degree of
conflict.
The approach is also fruitful if it
leads to an examination of the electoral system (does it represent all
interests?). Other aspects of social movements which come to light using this
approach include: Does the movement have any influential allies? How much tolerance for
protest is there among the political elite? Are there conflicts within the
elites? What are the institutional
conditions which regulate agenda-setting? What is the nature of decision-making
processes in the political system? (Della Porta
cites Sidney Tarrow 1989).
The main difficulty with this
approach is that it could amount to "political reductionism" –
explaining everything in terms of politics. Yet, as has been suggested, social
movements often occur when large-scale social and cultural change is
taking place, and the field of politics is too narrow to encompass such broad
social phenomena.
(iv) “new social movements”:
Marxism has always tried to view whole
societies, (e.g. for Althusser, the “mode of
production”) and to take into account historical change. Marxists are
concerned with the way that economic and technological change
(the “means of production”) underpin changes in social structures
(especially deriving from the “relations of production”). Their account of what
was happening in the mid-twentieth century therefore revolved around ideas of
ways in which industrial society was being transformed.
Marxism has also always tried to
demonstrate that there is bound to be conflict in any non-socialist society,
and to give reasons for conflict in terms of there being contradictions in the
system. Thus, when “new” social movements arose, (i.e. other than the
working-class-based movements that Marxism had predicted – e.g. youth
movements, feminism, black power), then many theorists who were influenced by
Marxism looked for new sources of conflict, new explanations of conflict
as having its origins in social structure, but based on the changing nature
of modern capitalist society. Questions posed for Marxists at this time
included the question as to whether the conflict between labour and capital was
still central. It was evident that there were new bases for social tension and
conflict (e.g. gender, sexuality) that were not entirely explainable in terms of control of the means of
production.
Some theorists on the left (not
least Castoriadis, see Recommencing Revolution) questioned
whether Marxism was still useful. In particular, the question arose as to
whether the Marxist “model” of society, in which technological and economic
features seemed to determine the character of the society, was still
acceptable. Others (e.g. E.P. Thompson, 1963) remained Marxists and tried to
develop a more subtle way of explaining class and conflict and the role of
culture, without arguing that culture was determined by class.
Various of these writers
described modern society as “post-industrial”, “post-Fordist”,
“technocratic”, etc. and attempted to identify a “central conflict” other than
the traditional Marxist view that it revolved around (the contradiction between
the means and the relations of) production. It is beyond the scope of these
notes to go into these ideas, since they are not necessarily of relevance to
the idea of social movements.
In relation to theories of social
movements, Alain Touraine was especially influential (e.g. 1977) in looking
again at the notion of “class”, and rejecting the idea of "homogeneous social
actors". He developed the notion of “historicity” – i.e. at any point in
time a given society has a definition of itself which it is striving to
maintain, and this is changing through history. However he also saw modern
capitalist society as increasingly “programmed” (incidentally in contrast to Castoriadis who argued that society was becoming more
meaningless and fragmented). Thus Touraine came to see social movements as "not
a marginal rejection of order, they are the central forces fighting one against
the other to control the production of society by itself… for the shaping of
historicity" (1981 p 29 cited in Della Porta).
For Claus Offe
(1985) also, social movements are of great significance in modern society,
since they challenge the whole existing political order: "movements develop a meta-political critique
of the social order and of representative democracy, challenging institutional
assumptions regarding conventional ways of doing politics, in the name of
radical democracy."
It has often been stressed that
“new social movements”, as they came to be called, differed from the “old” or traditional
movements (epitomised by the labour movement) in various ways:
- the
new movements were critical of modernism and progress, (whilst the labour
movement wanted material and economic progress in order to develop socialism)
- they
focussed attacks on bureaucracy (unlike the workers’ movement, which especially
in the USSR had allowed – maybe even caused? - bureaucracy to flourish)
- they
emphasised interpersonal solidarity (not class solidarity)
- they
wanted to reclaim autonomous spaces (rather than seeking material
advantage)
- their
structures were open, fluid organic (unlike the often highly disciplined labour
movement)
- they
were often non-ideological, encouraging inclusive participation
- they
put more emphasis on social or cultural aspects than on the economic.
As an
example of how writers tried to trace these features of new social movements
back to broad features of society as a whole, Melucci:
(1982, pp. 89, 96) argues that contemporary society is highly differentiated,
with much individual autonomy for action (deriving from the influence of the
market), but at the same time, those in power want closer integration and
control over individuals. New social movements then are seen as opposing the
intrusion of both the state and the market in social life, and attempting to
reclaim the “identity” of the individual, against the encroaching
"system".
Comment:
These approaches seem to be
useful in a number of ways: they analyse conflict in such a way as to examine
structural determinants, whilst not forgetting that the actor (not just the
structure – in contrast to Althusser) is important.
However, from my own point of view, it has to be said that this point was also made by writers (e.g.
Thompson) who were part of mainstream Marxism, or of the New Left…. There is a
tendency for some of the more recent theorists to forget their
antecedents!
Two other questions remain, which
these approaches may not deal with adequately:
- what
are the mechanisms that lead from conflict to action? (Why, and how, does
discontent get translated into the formation of a movement?)
- is there not a danger, with the
emphasis on “new social movements” of over-emphasising novel aspects of a
movement, or traits that are purely coincidental, or contingent, rather than having
deep significance?
4. Other
points:
(i) social movements and politics:
My own view would be that the
study of social movements has brought about – or could bring about – a
broadening of the study of politics, which too often is concerned with institutions
and structures that are remote from ordinary people’s concerns.
One way that
this has happened is a re-examination of the concept of “civil society”
(areas of life usually seen as “outside” politics). It is often argued that a strong
civil society is essential for democracy: recently this point has been used by,
e.g. John Gray (1995) as an argument against the new right, and their belief
that the basis of democracy is the “free market”. Others (e.g. Young in ed. Goodin
and Pettit 1997 p 256) have argued that it was as a result of social movements
in the nineteenth century that there was an extension of citizenship and
other civil rights. Another aspect of this is the suggestion that new
social movements (especially but not only the green movement) are associated
with the idea of a strong civil society, and with opposition to state
direction of, or involvement in, every aspect of life. This idea is mainly
associated with the political right, but the picture is more complicated than
that, as (a) the New Left also saw the state - even the welfare state - as a
tool for normalisation and control (see Charles Taylor in ed. Goodin and Pettit op cit), and (b) the new right, and
“Thatcherism” had an ambivalent position, being willing to use the state to
enforce conservative social values.
Thus, new
social movements can be seen as essentially libertarian, not simply confronting
the state, but bypassing it in stressing the need for free, voluntary,
autonomous associations.
5. A useful
overview of other theories and issues is in Stanford Lyman (ed) 1995.
These authors raise the following further questions:
(i) a perspective which is critical of social movements
is that of Salomon, who suggests that social movements since industrialisation
have been marked by a "religion of
progress", typified by Saint-Simon, Marx, Proudhon and Comte. All of these
attacked established religion in the name of "progress", and all
believed in man's power to control nature. At the same time they believed that
the human forces being unleashed could not (should not?) be controlled. The archetypal illustrative case is Marx: the
onward march of the proletariat to “socialism” cannot be halted, nor should it,
unless we want “barbarism”. On the other hand the romantic
movement demonstrated a similar attitude to blind social forces, which
it either worshipped or – more often - feared.
All these thinkers agreed that we could produce a perfect world. But,
Salomon argues, this "religion of progress", this faith in "intellectual
and moral perfectibility", being based on a "trans-historical horizon
of normative reason", is doomed to fail, or even to be replaced by a new
"religion".
(ii) On the other hand, Carl Boggs (in ed.
Lyman 1995) argues for the continuity of social movements from the “New
Left” of the 1960s, (despite an apparent “gap” which many writers comment
on, in the early 1980s). There were, he suggests, demands for: participatory
democracy, community, cultural renewal, collective consumption and the
restoration of nature – which “have typically been carried forward into the
modern ecology, feminist, peace and urban protest movements that have
proliferated since the early 1970s”. As implied already, I find it hard to
disagree that new social movements have many of the characteristics of the New
Left. I might go further and say that I cannot see how anyone believes there
was a “gap”...
(iii) Perhaps we can (and should) link 3 (i) and (ii) above, by agreeing that social movements are
concerned with the "self-production of society" (Touraine) but
stressing that society is constantly
generating its "meanings"?
For Park, for example, (in ed. Lyman 1995) societies have a
"general will", which changes at certain times, so that social
movements mark the beginnings of a desire for a shift in the "general
will". He then suggests a
correspondence between the individual's
psychological construction and "society"
- both are based on self- and socially-defined "meanings", and both
appear to be complex wholes (in the case of the individual we call this a
"personality").
However,
Park’s approach seems to me to be negative, since he goes on to argue that a
social movement first manifests itself when "crowds" begin to emerge,
which are based on new social relationships; next, these "crowds"
develop new social "norms" and form a new "public". Crowds are mainly based on instinctive or
psychological needs and links between people, but the "public" is formed
on the basis of rational public opinion.
Comments:
But if we believe social
movements are not based on reason, as Park (and Salomon) suggest, yet we
want to stress the importance of the “meanings” that social actors hold on to,
what then? Perhaps Castoriadis has a useful
contribution:
For Castoriadis
there is a clear an indissoluble link between the individual and
society. This is due to the fact that the individual’s world of meanings
(identity) is created by their subconscious, when it has taken in the
“meanings” provided by others. In other words, language itself is a social
phenomenon, as therefore is “meaning” itself. For Castoriadis
the “imagination” – in a special sense of the word – plays the essential
role of constructing meaning. But anything created by the imagination is not
simply an individual creation (because, as stated, the symbols and meanings
used in the process of imagining are socially derived), hence Castoriadis talks of the "social imaginary” and
of “social imaginary significations". The individual either accepts
these “significations” uncritically and unconsciously (which for Castoriadis is living “heteronomously”
– allowing others to control us – and causing the “alienation” of the
individual), or the individual, using their autonomy, “processes” the
meanings/significations in order to decide whether to accept them or not.
Castoriadis goes on to argue that in saying this it is
clear, almost by definition, that the individual’s autonomy has to be limited
(by its being based on the meanings of others).
That is, it is rational to aim for a self-limiting form of autonomy. It
is only under the all-pervasive influence of capitalism (and its
“imaginary significations”) that we have believed in the possibility of the
unlimited (unlimitable) powers of the individual, and
the unlimited domination of nature – both of which ideas are irrational.
Moreover, it is in capitalism
that one group of people (bureaucrats, capitalists, rulers of all sorts)
believe they can go on dominating and controlling others (in politics and in
production, as well as in the realm of ideas and beliefs). Since the individual has an innate need
for autonomy (no-one, except a confused child, wants either to be told what
to do all the time, or to tell others what to do all the time!), then it is
inevitable that people will reject this condition of alienation, and demand
(self-limited, social) autonomy.
This need for autonomy has
manifested itself in many ways, and most clearly does so in social movements.
*****************************************************
(*)
Footnote: Marxism and structural-functionalism.
Very briefly:
Marxism sees society as divided into social classes
– a class is a layer of society that has a particular economic role (a
particular “relationship to the means of production”), especially to either work
and sell their labour-power (the proletariat or working class) or to own the
means of production and to buy the labour of others (the bourgeoisie or
capitalist class). Marx recognised there were other social groupings, but
thought that since production is central to all aspects of society, then class
is also central. Given the way that capitalist society works, the two classes
are inevitably and always in conflict (e.g. the capitalist wants to make more
profit, the worker more wages). Eventually, given the impossibility of the
capitalists’ always making more profit (Marx thought he had described precise
economic laws at work here), there would have to be revolutionary change to
destroy capitalism and replace it with a more logical system i.e. socialism, where
there was not the class division of capitalism.
The crucial point as far as
social movements go is Marx’s view that class conflict underlies everything
else: for thorough-going Marxists any event, any set of ideas, can be
“explained” in terms of the ongoing class struggle. Also, the class that will
change society for the better socialist future is the proletariat.
For non-Marxists all this creates
problems: for example, Marxism reduces everything to the economy and production
– with (another problem) the consequence that individuals become less important
than broad structural features of society. Moreover many would argue that
Marxism is “deterministic”- that is, it places individuals and classes at the
mercy of economic and historical forces that can only be dealt with in the way
that Marxism prescribes i.e. by class-based political action to build
socialism. Such a view suggests that social movements are destined to fail
unless they tie themselves to the working class…
Structural
functionalism put itself
up as - or at least was seen by many as - a correction of Marxism: the appeal
of the latter was in its ability to see society as a whole, which previous
social theorists had not done. Structural functionalism then tried to address
the question: how do whole societies work? They argued that societies (when
functioning properly) seem to be self-regulating (the influence of systems
theory can be seen here). Of course, crises may occur, but these are signs of
breakdown (not, as Marxists would claim, signs of the beginning of a change for
the better). It follows also that, if societies are “systems”, every part of
society must have a function in relation to the regulation and maintenance of
society as a whole. Since functionalists argued that most of what occurs in
society helps it to work properly, one consequence was that crime and deviant
behaviour were seen as threatening to the social order. Functionalism can be
therefore be seen as a conservative approach to social
science, since crime becomes not just a nuisance but a threat to the whole
social order. Those who emphasised the key role of the “structure” also fell
into the same trap as hard-line Marxists: the individual is merely a pawn in a
game being played by some impersonal structure: society.
On the other hand, one strength
of the theory is its lack of prescription: to say that a society is self-maintaining, is not to say how it is structured. The
theory tends to be “pluralist” or even relativist (there are many different
kinds of society). However, if one sees society as simply an “individual
(person) writ large”, this can lead - paradoxically - to stressing the
importance of the individual. This is
clearly a positive feature of the theory for those (liberals especially) who
place a high value on individual freedom. But it is a weakness if you believe
the collective is more significant, and it is a weakness in terms of not
explaining the way that society is built up: how can it be just the sum of many
individuals?
************************************
References:
Aberle, D (1966) cited in Giddens
(1989).
Althusser, L, and Balibar, E (1970): Reading Capital, NLB (First published 1968); also: (1969) For Marx, Penguin.
Barry, J (1992): Movement and
Silence: Critical Reflections on Theories of the New Social Movements, UEL:
East London Business School, Occasional Papers on Business, Economy and
Society, No. 9, 1992.
Bauman, Z (1986): The Left as the
Counterculture of Modernity: from Telos no. 70 (Winter 1986 - 7) pp 81 - 93.
Bottomore, T (1979): Political Sociology (chapter 2).
Castoriadis, C (1991): The Imaginary Institution of
Society, Polity and (1997): Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, OUP.
Eisinger, P (1973): The Conditions of Protest
Behaviour in America, in American Political
Science Review 67, 11- 28, also (1981): The Voice and the Eye. An Analysis of Social Movements, Cambridge.
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