IMAGINING OTHER
How Enlightened was the
Enlightenment?
Links: Imagining
Other Index page
week 8: politics (2) the American and French
Revolutions, Burke and Paine
Political Philosophy Part 1 - Rousseau
Week 7: political ideas in the
Enlightenment (i) liberalism, Rousseau and Condorcet.
Summary:
1. Introduction
1.1 The spectrum of views –
from reform to revolution
1.2 A reminder of the
importance in the Enlightenment of ‘critique’
2. Enlightened
despotism/absolutism
2.1 Kant
2.2 Other philosophes and
other ‘enlightened depots’
3. The growth of liberalism
3.1 What exactly was
liberalism?
3.2 Criticisms of liberalism
3.3 John Locke (1632 – 1704)
3.4 Montesquieu (1689 – 1755)
– institutions, and culture
4. The movement towards
revolution: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778) and Condorcet (1743 – 1794)
5. The American Revolution –
rights of man
6. The French Revolution
*****************
1. Introduction:
1.1 The spectrum of views.
The Enlightenment thinkers
wanted change, but there was a spectrum of views, from revolution to reform.
Others argued either that the Enlightenment went too far that – there are
limits to Enlightenment (the ‘Kant problem’ - Outram), or that it did not go
far enough.
The best-known Enlightenment
figures were in favour of some
change, which they might have seen as profound or even revolutionary – and they
had some opponents who thought they were going too far. But to us, the
‘mainstream’ probably does not seem that radical.
As the century went on, in
1.2 A reminder of the importance in the Enlightenment
of ‘critique’:
The ‘philosophes’ saw their
role as one of critique (see week 1) – they wanted to remove constraints on
progress that took the form of unquestioning acceptance of tradition or of
religious and other authorities. Their central political demand therefore was
for freedom – freedom to criticise
without fear of punishment, and freedom
to think for themselves.
O’Hara argues that this led
to a ‘modern’ phenomenon the rise of ideology,
and ideological disputes: “…towards the end of the Enlightenment ‘history’s
first great ideological conflicts broke out… In a sense, the innovation of the
Enlightenment was to provide enough theory and ideology to make ideological
conflict possible.”
He concludes that the
Enlightenment changed politics in a number of ways – it was a counterweight to
the decisions or debates at court, and it put forward the interests of a wider class of people, i.e. the bourgeois – not the
‘rabble’ but not yet the general public either (though see below 2.1 on ‘public
opinion’).
Given the authoritarian
nature of the regimes of the time, as noted above the demand for freedom of
thought and tolerance was seen as a threatening demand (compare the Arab world
at the moment!).
I have also made the point
that many of the enlightenment thinkers took a rather elitist stance, and so
they were quite often prepared to work with existing rulers, even if the latter
were authoritarian.
2. Enlightened despotism/absolutism:
2.1 Kant:
(O’H p 74): his ‘austere’ theorizing didn’t have much practical impact, but the
idea that all should be treated equally and fairly ‘began an important
tradition.’
We should also note several
points concerning Kant’s impact on political ideas, as can be seen in his essay
What is Enlightenment?
(i) the importance of the
freedom to express critical opinions and ideas comes from Kant’s belief that we
all have an ‘inner core’ which is
entitled to, needs to, even has a duty to, question things (analogous to a
moral sense) (O’Hara)
(ii) perhaps the most important
outcome of this – and the other philosophes’ demands for freedom to express
opinions on politics etc – was the beginnings of what we now call ‘public opinion’. (O’Hara) After all the
‘public’ comprises those with no official status (as in Kant’s formulation).
O’Hara goes so far as to say (p 15): ‘The importance of public opinion both for
democracy and for fostering the
revolutionary forces of the age cannot be overstated.’
(iii) but as O’Hara and Outram point out, there were limits to the amount of freedom that was desirable, for
Kant, as for other philosophes:
- note his comment early in
the essay (first page), that ‘a revolution can never truly reform a manner of
thinking’ but it would lead to ‘new prejudices’ and: ‘Thus a public can only
attain enlightenment slowly.’
- officials, and anyone in a
position where they were answerable to those higher up than them should not
express their own opinions: ‘The private use of reason may… often be very
narrowly restricted, without otherwise hindering the progress of enlightenment’
(2nd page) – in ‘private’ situations (in official posts etc – ‘in
many affairs conducted in the interest of a community’) ‘one certainly must not
argue, instead one must obey’ …
- and he even notes an
apparent paradox: ‘a lesser degree of civil freedom provides enough room for
all fully to expand their abilities’ – and ‘a greater degree of civil freedom’
whilst it seemed advantageous, ‘established impassable boundaries’ for [the
people’s spiritual freedom] … I think he is hinting at the ‘chaos’ that would
ensue were everyone to be allowed to express their opinions freely.
In other words, Kant seems to
want to have it both ways: we have to escape immaturity, and the freedom to
question is essential (it would be quite wrong to bind people in unchangeable
ideas and rules) – but if someone is employed in a (‘public’ we would say)
position where they are accountable to others they should stay ‘in line.’
Dorinda Outram says ‘Kant’s
concerns about the disruptive impact of
Enlightenment [a problem which has been at the heart of the concerns of her
book – viz. The Enlightenment 2nd edn. 2005] were probably
justified.’
(iv) Kant and others actually
favoured an enlightened despot such as Frederick
the Great of
2.2 Other philosophes and other ‘enlightened depots’:
(i) Voltaire
‘proposed a centralized government that could disseminate ideas while
eliminating intolerance and superstition’ (O’H p 69), and he associated
absolutism with modernisation. He corresponded regularly with Frederick II (The
Great) of
Still, as O’Hara points out
(p 97)
(ii) Diderot
was more in favour of a technocratic government – rather than a monarchy like
Voltaire. He also took a radical stance over the American Revolution: the
American settlers had a right to change their government, but since they had
displaced the natives did they have a right to be there at all? Though he asked
this anonymously. (OH p 103)
(iii) (Porter?): the
relationship to power (of the philosophes)
– none were activists or politicians - except Edward Gibbon, MP, who never made
a speech!
(iv) O’Hara quotes the words
of
3. The growth of liberalism.
3.1 What exactly was liberalism?
Liberalism is the ideology
in which individuals have freedom, and their freedom and rights come before
those of the community or the state. The
drive for individual freedom and individual rights was mainly supported by
those who wanted to trade – and they
saw religious wars – as well as interference by the state – as an obstacle to
free trade. The traders and merchants saw themselves as value-creating, as against the aristocracy and the monarchy who
were rent-seeking (and depriving the public of money by funding wars, raising
tariffs etc).
Mercantilism – the view that money has value because it is
durable, and a nation’s duty is to build up its capital by e.g. promoting
exports, was popular, and supported by Locke. (OH p 79)
As
such, liberalism was a pre-requisite for modernisation.
3.2 Criticisms of liberalism.
Dunleavy and O'Leary argue that
liberalism derives from a "pre-democratic ideology" – that is, it
came from opposition (by the wealthy)
to Catholic dogmatism and to monarchical absolutism, in the 17th and 18th centuries...
hence: liberals originally stood for representative government for the propertied classes, to protect
against arbitrary state interference. This can also clearly be argued was the
case during the Enlightenment – and we can see the Enlightenment as marking the
rise of a new elite.
Some (see Porter) claim that the appeals to reason and
for freedom led to rulers increasing their power at the expense of the poor; physiocrats
such as Quesnay and Mirabeau argued for free trade (against the mercantilist
view that government should promote exports and put tariffs on imports), but
the result was that merchants profited, and the poor suffered. Physiocracy was the view that wealth
came from nature – a view which favoured agriculture; Scottish economists, and
Hume, developed this to criticise the emphasis on the ‘value’ of money. These
views were in contrast to Adam Smith for whom value came from labour (OH p 78).
Only after the growth of
socialist movements did most liberals accept that citizens = all adult males,
and only after feminism and anti-colonialism, did citizens become "all
adults" (see next week).
There is also a strong
criticism to be made of the ‘possessive
individualism’ of ‘liberal’ theory in the 17th and 18th
centuries (C.B. MacPherson rfc): this freedom was only, in fact, for propertied
males; a point noted by feminists
as well, of course (see later). Yet the theory claimed to be ‘universal’ – to
be applied to all humans
3.3 John Locke (1632 – 1704).
Locke is important for, among other ideas, the
idea of ‘natural rights’ – he believed that it was self-evident that it
is wrong to attack another’s rights to life liberty or property.
His starting-point was that the individual was made
by God. This is the basis of his advocating ‘natural rights’ (note how, as in
the Enlightenment, the word ‘natural’ is frequently used to make a point!).
However, as far as Locke was concerned, the most
important individual right was to own property; the state existed to
protect the individual and his (not ever “her”!) property.
Locke’s ideas had a strong an influence on many
subsequent proponents of capitalism. In his “Treatises on Government” he
defined what is known as the “liberal” political view, that has dominated
European thought (alongside socialism) ever since.
In the “Letter on Toleration” he said that
therefore each has a God-given right to his/her beliefs, conscience and
religious practices, and no-one has the right to dictate beliefs to others.
A further point that Locke makes is that since
everything comes from God it would be morally wrong to waste resources (e.g.
crops), or allow them to spoil (a point reiterated by Adam Smith).
Like Adam Smith, Locke believed that what we have
laboured to produce is our property.
In describing how the landowner then produces more than he can use, and sells
the “surplus” of his produce, Locke makes the case for inequality (as
does Smith). Unlike socialism, liberalism recognises the inevitability, and perhaps
desirability, of inequality.
Another aspect of Locke’s thinking that was
important at this time, and that contributed to liberal political systems, was
the ‘social contract’ (OH p 87) – consent is required from the people
for a government to be acceptable.
In other words, Locke’s
position on politics facilitated the idea of progress: he saw government as a mechanism which may need adjusting or even replacing with a
better-working model – as against the conservative view that politics and
society evolve naturally and gradually, and change should follow tradition
rather than ‘reason’.
The
philosophes’ position of basing their views on reason also facilitated the
growth of government based on ‘deliberation
and discussion’ (parliaments). (O’H p 68)
The influence of the 1688 ‘Glorious Revolution’ is important
here: a ‘reasonable’ constitutional settlement was arrived at, after the 17th
century civil war and the execution of the king.
Voltaire
promoted Locke’s ideas, and Montesquieu
wrote extensively in a similar vein to Locke concerning political institutions.
3.4 Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron Montesquieu (1689
– 1755)
One of the early modern
theorists (along with James Harrington 1611 – 1677 and John Locke) who
contributed to support for the idea of the ‘separation of powers’ (i.e. the legislature, the executive, and the
judiciary - usually) – as part of a theory of limited government.
The legislature formulates policy and enacts it as law, the executive carries policy into action,
and the judiciary applies the law
according to rules of procedural justice, and resolves disputes. (Scruton, Dictionary of Political Thought).
There is disagreement over the nature of the executive: in Locke’s theory the
waging of war and foreign policy were in a separate power, whereas in
Montesquieu they are given to the executive.
Montesquieu believed the
executive should be a monarch,
provided there was a possibility of impeachment
if the monarch exceeded their powers (as is the case in the USA); and so he
admired the English settlement of 1688, and spread Locke’s ideas, even though
the separation of powers does not exist in the British system: in the UK the
executive is the Cabinet, which is drawn from (i.e. members of) the legislature
– the highest court, the Lords, is also part of the legislature… The judiciary
is less a power than a brake on power (as Montesquieu observed). Scruton
comments that the separation of powers is rather like the Trinity – three must
be one and one must be three!!
Montequieu’s ideas were based
on new approaches to science
(inductive practice, O’H p 70), using observation/experimentation and description. He believed that each
society had a distinct ‘natural genius’ or ‘spirit’ (arising from things like geographical, historical and climatic
conditions) and that laws should be designed in accord with this (The Spirit of Laws 1748).
He identified a different
‘spirit’ (or moral sentiment) in different constitutions: in monarchy the fundamental
moral sentiment is honour; in a republic it is ‘political virtue’ and a sense
of public responsibility.
In other words a constitution
expresses social conditions – a view which Durkheim described as the first
example of a sociological perspective.
He was an influence on Burke (from Scruton) (see next week on Burke).
Scruton says that he believed
in restoring liberties that had been
lost rather than advocating the new ‘and what he saw as dangerous’
liberties of the Enlightenment. Himmelfarb says he was ‘more representative of
the British Enlightenment than of the French.’
He advocated ‘moderation’ and
always referred to the context of political judgments, and focused on
institutions and methods. He came to reject republicanism, although attracted
to it in theory, because he was disillusioned with what he saw in
His views on the separation
of powers were adopted by the Americans (see later) – especially Franklin and
Jefferson (see below). Catherine the
Great was influenced as well… But in France events overtook his ideas (he died
in 1755) – especially when Voltaire continually attacked the clergy, and argued
that the parlements acted in the interests of their class/members
(lawyers presumably), and when Voltaire kept challenging the decisions of the parlements. To illustrate their
reactionary hold, when Louis XV wanted to ban torture, the parlements opposed him. Studying French institutions (giving due
weight to the context…) Montesquieu saw roles for the nobility, clergy,
chartered cities and parlements
(local law courts which had the duty of approving and interpreting legislation
laid down centrally – OH p 71)
3.5 (i) Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778) and (ii)
Condorcet (Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas
de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet
(1743 – 1794) – French philosopher and mathematician
(NB see also week 4, on human
nature in Rousseau, and pp10 notes).
Extracts are from the Everyman paperback edition of
The Social Contract and Discourses, tr. G.D.H. Cole, first published 1973,
reprinted 1990
(i) Rousseau opposed the absolute monarchy, and social inequalities, as did the other
“philosophes”... However, his approach differed very much from the other
political ideas of the time in France, and which were often influenced by
Locke.
The famous opening words of his Social Contract are: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.
One believes himself the master of others, and yet he is a greater slave
than they.”
He believed that the evolution of society had brought about
inequality, based on ownership of property
and especially of land. ‘Man’ originally (in the ‘state of nature’) had, as
Rousseau believed, no sense of morality beyond a sympathy for his fellows (pitié) and a sense of his own worth (amour de soi). A comparison can be made
with Adam Smith here – and with Kant… The transition to society brought a more
sophisticated sense of morality, but also brought the evils of inequality and
war (both springing from property ownership).
“The cultivation of the earth
necessarily brought about its distribution; and property, once recognised, gave
rise to the first rules of justice…” (p 94)
“from the moment one man began
to stand in need of the help of another; from the moment it appeared
advantageous to any one man to have enough provisions for two, equality disappeared,
property was introduced, work became
indispensable…. Slavery and misery were soon seen (op cit p 92).
“The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself
of saying 'This is mine', and found people simple enough to believe him, was
the real founder of civil society. From
how many crimes, wars and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might
not anyone have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling in the
ditch, and crying to his fellows 'Beware of listening to this impostor; you are
undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and
the earth itself to nobody.” (p 84)
Rousseau’s powerful expression
of his arguments contributed to the spread of revolutionary ideas – especially the idea of the sovereignty of the people, based on the
general will.
The General Will is a radical and highly
controversial idea: it indicates an expression by the people as a whole of what
is in their general interest. To arrive at it, each citizen would have to put aside their own personal interests
whilst trying to identify what is in the interests of the whole community.
Of
course, it appears highly idealistic to expect a whole nation to agree on what is
in their common interest (though it is most likely that Rousseau believed that
this would only be only possible in small communities), and the way Rousseau
puts it, especially the statement that an individual who disagrees with the
general will would have to be ‘forced to
be free’ has led many to reject the idea completely.
If, then, one reduces the social
compact to its essence, it amounts to this: “Each of us puts his person and all
his power to the common use under the supreme direction of the general will;
and as a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”
Immediately, in place of the
private person of each contractant, this act of association produces a moral
and collective Body.”
Another radical side to Rousseau
was in his rejection of representative
democracy, in favour of what we would call direct democracy... He said that the British people were foolish to
believe they were free, because they could only exercise this ‘freedom’ once
very five years!
These ideas, that the collective
can express its own will, and that direct democracy if preferable to
representative methods, are based largely on his respect for the ordinary citizen: “It is the common people who compose the human race; what is not the
people is hardly worth talking about.
Man is the same in all ranks; that being so, the ranks which are most
numerous deserve most respect”. (Emile, quoted in Sabine p 579)
Note finally that a key
distinction between Rousseau’s and other philosophes’ approach was the emphasis
in the former on feeling or sentiment (sensibilité) – as against reason…
(ii) Condorcet
tried to use Rousseau’s general will idea, but called it ‘public reason’ (because of the danger of following ‘will’ rather
than ‘reason’ – and in particular the danger of a tyranny of the majority under
Rousseau’s formula).
However, he then argued that
a small elite group was most likely to produce the best ideas, and as a
mathematician he worked out a ‘social arithmetic’ to guide their decisions (OH
p 90). The problem then was how to stop the elite becoming self-perpetuating
and dictatorial, simply serving its own interests as the parlements had. It
should, he suggested, be elected by several provincial assemblies of citizens.
Tragically, after the
Revolution his ideas were seen as too elitist, and when he opposed the
execution of Louis XVI he was imprisoned – only to die in prison, possibly by
suicide to escape the execution that awaited him.