IMAGINING OTHER
How Enlightened was the
Enlightenment?
Week 6: Human
Nature in Smith, Rousseau and Kant
Links: Imagining Other Index page
Week 6: Adam Smith (extra notes)
Week 6: Rousseau - extra notes
Adam Smith 1723 – 1790,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1712 – 1778,
Immanuel Kant 1724 –
1804
1. Adam Smith - Summary:
1.1 Introduction: the British Enlightenment
1.2 Smith's ethical ideas
1.3 How are ethical standards formed?
1.4 Democratisation of morality?
1.5 On politics, economics and ethics.
1.1 The ‘British Enlightenment:
Gertrude Himmelfarb (2004)
argues that the British Enlightenment was different to the French – and,
paradoxically, it was the French who most revered
Sabine comments that the philosophy of Adam Smith’s
time, as with Locke 100 yrs before, was an odd mixture of empiricism (the basis of scientific method: we find out about the
world by observing its behaviour) and a
belief in natural law/natural rights, which must be God-given): for Smith,
"natural law (God's law)" could be seen in the empirical regularities
at work in society.
A key idea of writers such as
Adam Smith, and before him Shaftesbury and others, was that we all have an innate moral sense – a
‘sympathy’ as Smith put it, which allows us to imagine what others are feeling, and which then brings us to
feel with - to sympathise with - them, and hence to condemn whatever is making
them suffer and praise what is making them happy etc.
[This was a step on from Locke and
NB. Note
particularly that Smith is talking of feelings,
not of rationality. Gertrude Himmelfarb stresses this point (p 137 - 8),
linking Smith and his fellow members of the Scottish Enlightenment to the later
romantic movement. She also quotes Smith’s words: ‘it is by the imagination (my emphasis) only that we
can form any conception of what are his [the unfortunate’s] sensations.’
Moreover, there is an aesthetic side to this, since those for whom ‘the beauty
of order, of art and contrivance’ is important are those who will support those
institutions that promoted the ‘public welfare’.
For recent evidence that we are
not the rational creatures that we might like to think, see the book by Daniel Kahneman’: Thinking, Fast and Slow
(
That this discussion of the
inter-relationship between thinking and feeling is an ongoing one, see the
obituary (Guardian Weds 9th Nov 2011) of the philosopher Peter
Goldie, who wrote: The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (2000). He was
‘impatient with the rational/irrational perspective on emotions, and believed
that emotions should be assessed less in terms of their rationality than of how
appropriate and proportionate they are in specific situations (a terminology
that is remarkably similar to Adam Smith’s – see the Extracts 2b).
The Earl of Shaftesbury on the other hand wrote in 1699 An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit: virtue comes form a
‘moral sense’ the ‘sense of right and wrong’ – not from religion,
self-interest, sensation or reason. We
also had a ‘natural affection’ which he saw as ‘social affection’ virtuous man
is motivated by ‘a natural affection for his kind’. Locke was wrong, he argued,
to believe that moral sense was learned: this would make it determined by
‘fashion and culture’… (and relative!).
On the other hand, Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees 1705
tried to refute Shaftesbury by arguing that: self-love is the primary
motivation of all men, and it can be reduced to pleasure and pain. Fellow
feeling and condolence for others was a spurious passion (and one which
afflicted the weakest minds the most…) - ‘what we call evil in this world,
moral as well as natural, is the grand principle that makes us sociable
creatures.’
Smith dismissed these views as
‘licentious’ and ‘wholly pernicious’ – Mandeville was also attacked by
Berkeley, Francis Hutcheson, Edward Gibbon…
Hutcheson in 1726 wrote: An Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our
ideas of Virtue or Moral Good – he defended Shaftesbury’s ideas (especially the ‘moral
sense’) against Mandeville. He was in fact the first to use the expression:
“The greatest happiness for the greatest numbers’ NB it was not Helvetius or
Bentham! And it was not the same ideas as theirs, because for utilitarians it
derives from rational calculations of utility.
Hutcheson argued that
fellow-feeling cannot come from self-love, because it involves feeling others’
pain. It was ‘antecedent to reason or
instruction’ (Himmelfarb p 32). Reason alone cannot guide us – we needs our
senses in situations where the problem is self-preservation, and we need our
moral sense when we need to ‘direct our actions for the good of the whole’.
Even Hume believed in a
‘sentiment’ a ‘moral sense’ a ‘moral taste’ common to all men. A ‘disinterested
benevolence’ was an essential quality of human nature (disinterested = divorced
from personal relations and affections).
1.2 Smith's ethical ideas:
In his ethics (“The Theory of
Moral Sentiments” 1759…) he tackled questions of: the individual & society, conflict and co-operation, self-interest
and altruism.
The opening words (Extract TMS 1) contain a
statement of his view on the ability of humans to feel pity, compassion,
benevolence, sympathy.
Extract TMS 1. “How selfish
soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature,
which interest him in the fortune of others and render their happiness
necessary unto him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of
seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for
the misery of others when we either see it or are made to conceive it in a
lively manner… By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation… we
enter, as it were, into his body and become in some measure the same person
with him.” (Opening words of TMS)
Note the role of the imagination
here:
‘it is
by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations.’
Note also that we do not imagine
ourselves feeling the suffering etc of the other, but we ‘become in some
measure the same person with him’ – so sympathy is not a selfish principle (a
man might also sympathise with a woman’s pain in childbirth…). Also, he says
that we have an ‘immediate sense and feeling’ – we do not come to it as a
result of reasoning.
He argued that there must be an
element of perceived common interest for any society to function, and that we
acquire our moral sense from being in society
(cf. Rousseau):
TMS 2. Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to
manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species,
he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his
own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of
the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot
easily see... and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can
present them to his view. Bring him into
society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted
before. [from Raphael, D.D.: Adam Smith,
TMS 3. We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and
endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we
can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety
of our own conduct. [TMS I iii (iii) (?)]
1.3 How are ethical standards formed? [see: Cole and Strauss, Cropsey]
There are four steps in the
formation of ethics and social standards:
1. self-judgment
2. imagining effects of our
actions on others
3. imagining others'
perceptions/assessments of our actions
4. social code and sanctions
To pass to stages 2 and 3 we
make use of the idea of an ‘impartial
observer’ -so it is not just a
question of thinking ‘how would we feel?’ – since that might lead to
‘distortions’ in our judgment of others’ feelings (evidence not here for this).
In other words, the basis of
morality is sympathy not abstract reason (but S & C: only rationality can promote freedom...) Here there is a strong contrast with Kant.
1.4 Democratisation of morality?
Smith is therefore attempting to
ground ethics in a ‘scientific’, humanist approach: ethics must be derived from "man as man."
This, it can be argued (S & C), represents a ‘democratisation of morality’ - as
against earlier formulations e.g. Plato: philosophers discover the ethical
‘truth’; and the Christian view: God reveals the truth.
In a similar vein, Himmelfarb
makes much of the ‘implicitly democratic character’ of Smith’s political
economy (p 67)… after all, she points out, the labourer is the source of value.
Smith’s view of human nature was
somewhat egalitarian: ‘The difference in natural talents in different men
is, in reality, much less than we are aware of… By nature a philosopher is not
in genius and disposition half so different from a street porter as a mastiff
is from a greyhound, or a greyhound from a spaniel’ (p 69) - in this Himmelfarb
believes Smith to be very different to the French philosophes, who were, as I
have suggested, explicitly elitist.
1.5 On politics, economics and ethics:
Finally, it is worth saying that
in Smith’s view, since feelings of sympathy are natural, there is no need for
the state to try to enforce them (he was opposed to the ‘civic humanist’
tradition (e.g. Rousseau) where the kind of society you live in is crucial to
determine whether you are moral or not.
Moreover, whilst the
market mechanism works on the basis of self-interest, he acknowledged that too
much self-interest leads to selfishness, which in society
is prevented by
family ties, neighbours etc; these factors don't work in the economy. He even
says that the self-interest that drives the market (the desire
to
own more, out of fear of being poor and envy of the rich) is a "corruption
of our natural sentiments"
2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1712 – 1778
Summary:
2.1 Rousseau and the
philosophes.
2.2 Human nature, the ‘state of
nature’.
2.3 Women
2.1 Rousseau and the
philosophes.
Rousseau
was untypical among the Enlightenment philosophes – he had arguments with
Voltaire, who called him a ‘Judas’; Diderot called him an ‘anti-philosophe’
(Gertrude Himmelfarb: The Roads to Modernity, 2008, p 151); and he had a very
personal falling-out with Hume when he stayed with him in Scotland for a while
– he accused Hume (by all accounts a very genial man) of plotting against him,
and in fact Rousseau may have had a persecution complex.
He was
born in
This
account illustrates his belief that passions
were more important than reason, whilst of course ‘reason’ was the central
concern of most of the philosophes. His way of thinking was an early example of
‘romanticism’
He also
argued that the arts and sciences, far from improving people had led to a corruption of our natural innocence,
and that they serve to make us accept the existing "civilised" order,
i.e. to accept our slavery.
In his
political theories Rousseau also differed from the other philosophes
(especially Voltaire, who was an enthusiastic supporter of John Locke),
emphasising (i) the collective
rather than the individual citizen, and (ii) direct democracy rather than representative or elective democracy
(I look at the political views of Rousseau in Political
Philosophy part 2 - Rousseau).
However,
he shared with the other Enlightenment philosophes their opposition to absolute monarchy (he and Voltaire both had to take
temporary refuge abroad because of their views), and he was highly critical of social inequalities.
2.2 On human nature, the ‘state
of nature’ etc:
In his
Discourse on Arts and Sciences (1749/50) he argued the arts and sciences have
corrupted us – not what other Enlightenment thinkers would have said!
In the 1753/4: Discourse on Inequality he sets out his views on the
fundamental nature of man, and on the origin of society, private property and
conflict.
To
develop his critique of existing society he asked what humans would have been
like before the institution of society. Rousseau saw society as unnatural, and
a social sense is therefore also not natural but artificial. In other words to
define ‘human nature’ we have to think about what humans would have been like
before society.
Note
that many political philosophers (not just in the Enlightenment) used the
device of conjecturing a ‘state of nature’ as a starting point for their
theories.
For
some it seems to have been an actual historical condition – for others merely a
useful hypothesis. Either way, it was a popular device - after all, once
something has been labeled ‘natural’ it is very hard to oppose or reject it… It
has often been said that the word ‘natural’ was a central concept in
Enlightenment thinking.
Using evidence from the writings
of travellers and naturalists such as Buffon, he explores the nature
of man: natural man would be roving
individuals; there would be no permanent relationships, but a "loose
companionship"; there would be no love, no family, no morality, and no
property; people would be free, but without knowledge, language, morality, or
industry – they would be neither moral nor vicious: in a word – “innocent”. (Berki)
For
Rousseau, then, the ‘savage’ in the state of nature was not selfish (as in Hobbes)
nor even rational (as in Locke) – for these abilities, he argued, arose as a
result of our interaction with others, and especially in ‘civilisation’.
[For
Hobbes, in the 17th century, the state of nature was one in which
life was ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ – and in the state of
nature (since there were no laws to restrain people) men would be constantly
competing with each other (a ‘war of all against all’). For Locke, (also in the
17th century, but more influential on the Enlightenment thinkers) on
the other hand, since men were rational, the state of nature was simply lacking
in ways of enforcing what the majority of people regarded as right (especially
the right to ‘life, liberty and property’). ]
Hence
the idea (not exactly what Rousseau was saying) of the noble savage. In this, Rousseau was a precursor of the ‘romantics’
(Wordsworth and others) of the early 19th century: he also loved
“nature” and wrote a book about his walks, and his dreaming as he walked
through the countryside. He admired the newly “discovered” native peoples,
whose lives were described by travellers, as he believed they led more natural
lives than the civilised French. In retort, Voltaire sarcastically said that
Rousseau's praise of the "noble savage" was so convincing that it
made him want to get down on all fours.
Rousseau’s view of human nature
(before society changes it) is that we all have two natural (pre-social)
sentiments or feelings (sensibilité).
Again, and most importantly, unlike the other Enlightenment thinkers, Rousseau
does not attribute reasoning powers to us as ‘natural’ or pre-social… We have feelings first, and he identifies two
such sentiments/feelings: amour de soi, and
pitié:
- amour de soi – [love of oneself] is not the
same as amour-propre, [self-love]:
self-love develops in society, especially after the institution of property…
and it is the basis of false values such as "honour", pride and
vanity... Rather amour de soi could
be self-respect
or self-preservation. Simply: the desire
to satisfy our own short-term needs – and presumably not to be hurt.
- pitié – [pity] but probably best
translated as sympathy or compassion. Pitié
is not the same as altruism, but rather the desire not to hurt others.
For Himmelfarb, Rousseau’s account,
in Emile, of how the central character develops ‘social feelings’ is that these
feelings are based on self-love (because self-love comes first in human
development): “When the strength of an expansive soul makes me identify myself
with my fellow, and I feel that I am, so to speak, in him, it is in order not
to suffer that I do not want him to suffer. I am interested in him for love of
myself (l’amour de moi).” And this is also the ‘source of [a sense of?]
justice’: “Love of men derived from love of self is the principle of human
justice.”
I have several comments on
Himmelfarb’s implied position here (she is contrasting Rousseau with other
writers – Smith, Hutcheson - who posit an inherent social feeling): first that
Rousseau is describing a process of evolution or development, and in this he
surely is right: a child is self-centred before becoming other-oriented.
Second: how can I know what another is feeling when they are suffering unless I
can identify those feelings in myself first? Third: Rousseau’s formulation
seems to me very close to the ‘golden rule’: Do unto others as you would wish
them to do unto you (or: love others as you love yourself…). Finally, this
passage could be read quite differently, (especially the strange expression ‘I
feel that I am, so to speak, in him’) along the lines of Satish Kumar’s
formulation (the title of one of his books – Green Books 2002): “You are,
therefore I am.”
Note also that there is common
ground between Rousseau and Adam Smith on ‘pity’ or compassion – Smith may have
got the idea from Rousseau’s 1755 Discourse on Inequality, which he reviewed
three years before his Theory of moral Sentiments was published. The latter may
in turn have influenced Rousseau when he wrote Emile (1758).
The implications of these views
for Rousseau’s political ideas are explored at: Political
Philosophy Part 2 - Rousseau.
2.3 Women:
Rousseau
had a controversial view of the role of women
– in fact he saw them as a threat to public order, because they do not have
men’s rationality!! Men would be active in public affairs, i.e. politics,
whilst women brought up the children.
Yet he gave women an important
role in the home, bringing up children with a sense of responsibility,
morality, duty etc, which underpins the civic virtues... This idea was seen by
many women of the time as progressive. Perhaps part of its appeal was the
importance Rousseau put on "natural" feelings. But it did mean that
woman would have a separate role, and not be allowed to take part in public
life… Contemporary feminist writers such as Carol Pateman have little time for
Rousseau.
3. Kant 1724 – 1804: A rational grounding for ethics.
Plan:
3.1 Kant’s life and influences
3.2 Kant’s ethics and philosophy are linked
3.3 The categorical imperatives
3.1 Kant’s life and influences:
Russell says he ‘is generally
considered the greatest of modern philosophers.’ But he adds ‘I myself cannot
agree with this estimate, but it would be foolish not to recognize his great importance.’
(p 677)
He was born at Königsberg, at
a time when two religious movements were influential (David Appelbaum p 4):
(i) deism – the belief that reason can demonstrate the existence of God
(etc), and reason should replace faith (see week 3);
(ii) (since the end of the 17th
century) pietism – the belief that
religion had to be experienced rather than learned from texts.
Philosophically, he was
influenced by Rousseau (e.g. The
Confessions, and Rousseau’s emphasis on sensibilité) as he put confidence in
‘the lawfulness of inner experience.’
He was also influenced by
current scientific thinking, and especially affected by encountering Hume’s arguments. Hume’s scepticism
about what we can know for sure about the world (our sense are unreliable, and
causality is not possible to prove) led Kant to study the process of cognition.
3.2 Kant’s ethics and his philosophy are linked
together:
This is what makes Kant a
great philosopher (for those who admire him).
He overturned the
common-sense view that our understanding corresponds to how the world is (see
the notes on science): i.e. Locke’s view that the mind reflects the world as it
is...
For Kant our conscious
reasoning imposes sense and meaning
on the world (e.g. the concepts of space
and time, quantity etc, which are innate ideas) – so the world corresponds to
how we understand it.
However, we can only have
objective knowledge of ‘phenomena’ – things as they appear to us. We cannot
completely ‘know’ the objective world ‘from the inside’ or ‘in itself’ (=
‘noumena’) – we are separate from it, because we have ‘subjectivity’ (see
below).
When we do look inside
ourselves, we experience our ‘autonomy’ – that
is, the freedom to make moral choices, which enables us to perfect our human
potential. This capacity for moral
understanding is ‘practical knowledge’ – i.e. arises through activity and
participation (and is different from ‘objective knowledge’). As distinct from
the world of objects, which is ‘conditional’ (i.e. objects obey physical laws),
the ‘inner world’ is ‘unconditional’ that is, characterised by freedom – that
is, ‘autonomy’. (See note at end for
a recent critique of this idea). However, autonomy for Kant does not mean being
free to do what we want – rather we need to remember the word’s etymology: auto
= self, nomos = law, thus: setting laws for ourselves – and it is tied in with
the idea of developing and perfecting ourselves. Following our ego alone would
not lead to our being better people.
Reason’s “true function must
be to produce a will that is good, not as a means to some further end, but in
itself.” (From The Moral Law)
Good acts arise from a sense
of duty (to the moral law), not from self-interest or even good intentions.
Simon Blackburn (Oxford
Dictionary of Philosophy) quotes Kant’s saying: ‘two things move the mind with
ever increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on
them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within.’ (Conclusion to the
second Critique, of Practical Reason.) Blackburn points out that the words
derive from St John Chrysostome, and the 19th Psalm! He also says
that it is difficult to disentangle the Lutheran elements of Kant’s thinking
(see below on the Categorical Imperatives).
In order to develop and
perfect ourselves, (to ‘preserve our community with a wider realm of being’ as
Appelbaum puts it) we need to ‘let drop the ego and its mode of consciousness.’
The development of moral consciousness is for Kant (as it was for Rousseau) the way to
liberation.
This is similar to Rousseau’s
statement that we are free when we obey a law we have ourselves formulated, but
enslaved when we merely follow our appetites. Obedience to the moral law grants us freedom from nature (from the
objective world – including our egos).
Nature binds us to appetite,
reactivity and craving – our inner self searches for its own destiny. Nature
ties us into laws that bind us – and is heteronomous
(laws set by forces outside ourselves); our inner self gives us laws that
bring freedom – that is, we are then autonomous
(etymologically: auto = self, nomos = law) – setting laws for ourselves.
The moment we ask ourselves
‘what should I do?’ we are open to trying to define moral laws to follow.
See also Kant’s essay ‘What
is Enlightenment?’ where he writes of mankind reaching ‘maturity’, emerging
from ‘tutelage’ etc.
3.3 Kant then formulated two ‘categorical imperatives’
- categorical meaning (Appelbaum:)
with no exceptions or provisos, and the opposite of ‘hypothetical. Russell p
682: hypothetical is ‘you must if you wish to… (bring something about
etc).’ Categorical is objectively
necessary without regard to any end (it is synthetic and a priori - draws on
experience but not derived from experience, but known by reason - in my
words…).
Imperative meaning that we
are ordained by our being to obey (in Appelbaum’s words p 29).
The first categorical imperative: obedience to an
inner moral law, that we would be happy for everyone to obey. In Kant’s words:
‘Act only according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it
shall become a general law (universal)’. (Critique of Practical Reason)
The second: treating others (and yourself) as ends and
not (purely) as means. “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a
means, but always at the same time as an end.”
Blackburn identifies examples
of what Kant would be forbidden by the first: lying, suicide, revolution,
solitary sex, and even selling one’s hair for wig-making! (Hence the comment
about Lutheranism above).
Russell says that this
principle does not seem to be entailed by the first, and that it is an abstract
form of the doctrine of human rights,
and open to the same objections – what
to do when interests conflict (as they so often do in politics)? To solve
this, some people’s interests might have to be sacrificed for others, e.g. for
the majority.
The principle could be made
stronger, says Russell, by understanding it to mean not that each is an absolute
end, but that everyone counts equally when considering policies which affect
them – i.e. an argument for democracy.
On the other hand, Appelbaum
stresses that if we are to develop fully as human beings, then respect for
others – and the recognition of their rights to full development – is
unavoidable.
Recent comments:
1. Joanna Bourke, in What It Means to be Human:
Reflections from 1791 to the Present
(Virago 2011) argues that ‘The autonomous, self-willed ‘human’ at the heart of
humanist thinking is a fallacy, a chimera.’
She also says that human
rights is a ‘volatile principle on which to base ethics’ – a point with which
John Gray agrees in his review of the book (Guardian 29.10.11).
2. On the other hand, Emanuel Derman, in New Scientist 22.10.11,
pp 32-33: Unruly humans vs the lust for order, argues that (i) the models
and methods of the physical sciences cannot be applied to human affairs – for
example, he tried to use mathematical formulae to work out how humans interact
in markets (ii) there is a paradox (which Kant would have liked!): ‘On the one
hand, scientists have the ability to discover nature’s mechanistic laws: on the
other, to discover them we have to assume that scientists have autonomy (my emphasis), they can tell
right from wrong, they are not mechanical beings. In short, to find the laws,
we must assume we are not subject to them.’
3. Another recent book: Stranger Magic: Charmed States and the
Arabian Nights, by Marina Warner (Chatto and Windus 2011) argues that the
Enlightenment sealed magic off from science, imagination from reason, and also
east from west (in the words of Robin Yassin-Kassab, in a review Guardian
12.11.11) – and then this ‘stranger magic’ was seen as foreign, ‘black etc. Yet
the book demonstrates (i) that enchantment and magic (especially through the
exchange between different countries of books on enchantment, such as the
Arabian Nights) can ‘open new possibilities of thought and sympathy’ (RY-K) and
(ii) she argues - by demonstrating the ‘magical’ elements in talismans,
designer goods, the psychiatrist’s consulting-room etc - for (as RY-K puts it)
‘the necessity of magic, especially in a self-consciously ‘rational’, secular
world.’ (See notes on literature, and
conclusion to the course).
References:
(i) On Adam Smith and
Adam Smith The Theory of Moral
Sentiments” 1759
Raphael, D.D.: Adam Smith,
Fontana 1985
The Earl of Shaftesbury 1699 An
Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit
Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees
1705
Hutcheson in 1726 An Inquiry
Concerning the Original of Our ideas of Virtue or Moral Good
(ii)Works by Rousseau referred to:
Discourse on Arts and Sciences
(1749/50)
Discourse
on Inequality (1753/4)
Emile (1758)
(iii) Kant:
David Appelbaum: The Vision
of Kant, Element Books, 1995.
Kant’s writings:
1781 Critique of Pure Reason
1783: Prolegomena to any
Future Metaphysics that may be Presented as a Science,
1784: What is Enlightenment?
1785: Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals.
1788: Critique of Practical
Reason.
1790: Critique of Judgment.
1793: Religion Within the
Limits of Reason Alone.
1795: Eternal Peace.
1797: Metaphysics of Morals.
(iv) General:
Simon Blackburn: Oxford
Dictionary of Philosophy, 1994.
Bertrand Russell: A History
of Western Philosophy, Unwin 1946.
Gertrude Himmelfarb: The
Roads to Modernity, Vintage, 2004
Other histories of political
thought by: R.N. Berki, Strauss and Cropsey, Sabine and Thorsen.
(v) Recent books mentioned:
Daniel Kahneman: Thinking, Fast
and Slow (Allen Lane, 2011)
Peter Goldie: The Emotions: A
Philosophical Exploration (2000)
Joanna Bourke: What It Means to be Human: Reflections
from 1791 to the Present (Virago 2011)
Emanuel Derman, in New Scientist 22.10.11, pp 32-33:
Unruly humans vs the lust for order
Stranger Magic: Charmed States and the Arabian Nights,
by Marina Warner (Chatto and Windus 2011)
****************