IMAGINING OTHER
How Enlightened was the
Enlightenment?
Links: Imagining
Other Index page
week 3: Religion
in the Age of Enlightenment
Week 5: human nature, and ethics, in Adam Smith
Week 4: Human nature: Jean-Jacques
Rousseau 1712 – 1778
Summary:
1. Rousseau and the philosophes.
2. The arts and sciences, and education.
3. Human nature, society and
politics: the ‘state of nature’.
4. Women
5. Society, inequality, war
6. Religion
7. Politics
1. Rousseau and the philosophes.
Rousseau
was untypical among the Enlightenment philosophes – he had arguments with
Voltaire, who called him a ‘Judas’; Diderot called him an ‘anti-philosophe’ (Gertrude
Himmelfarb: The Roads to Modernity, 2008, p 151); and he had a very personal
falling-out with Hume when he stayed with him in Scotland for a while – he
accused Hume (by all accounts a very genial man) of plotting against him, and
in fact Rousseau may have had a persecution complex.
In
particular he believed (i) the passions
were more important than reason, whilst of course ‘reason’ was the central
concern of most of the philosophes. In his political theories (see section 7) he
differed from Locke, of whose ideas Voltaire was an enthusiastic supporter, emphasising
(ii) the collective rather than the
individual citizen, and (iii) direct
democracy rather than representative or elective democracy.
On (ii)
the collective, as Himmelfarb (2008, p 174)) puts it: ‘when Rousseau spoke of
the “greatest happiness of all”, he meant it in some transcendent, metaphysical
sense, a “common good of men” that was something other than the sum of the
goods of individual men.’ (See section 7 on the ‘general will’).
Rousseau’s
tendency to ‘generalize’ the virtues, and to elevate the whole of mankind over
the individual’ was however typical of the philosophes (as GH sees it).
He also
shared with the other Enlightenment philosophes their opposition to absolute monarchy (he and Voltaire both had to take
temporary refuge abroad because of their views), and he was highly critical of social inequalities.
He was born
in
2. On the arts and sciences, and education.
He
wrote an essay - the Discourse on Arts
and Sciences (1749/50) - for a competition, on the question “Has the
Revival of the Sciences and Arts helped to Purify or to Corrupt Morals?” His
answer was highly original and controversial: nearly everyone in the Age of
Reason would have praised the arts and sciences for their contribution to
civilisation. Rousseau declared they were the cause of a corruption of our natural innocence, and that they serve to make
us accept the existing "civilised" order, i.e. to accept our slavery.
He is also known for writing on
education, especially in Emile (1758)
and in a novel Julie. Both these
works describe the upbringing of a child, and both advocate a child-centred
approach. However, they are controversial today, since he believed that boys
and girls should be brought up in very distinct ways – because they would play
different roles in society (see 4 below).
3. On human nature, the ‘state
of nature’ etc:
In the 1753/4: Discourse on Inequality he sets out his views on the
fundamental nature of man, and on the origin of society, private property and
conflict.
To
develop his critique of existing society he asked what humans would have been
like before the institution of society. Rousseau saw society as unnatural, and
a social sense is therefore also not natural but artificial. In other words to
define ‘human nature’ we have to think about what humans would have been like
before society.
Note
that many political philosophers (not just in the Enlightenment) used the
device of conjecturing a ‘state of nature’ as a starting point for their
theories.
For
some it seems to have been an actual historical condition – for others merely a
useful hypothesis. Either way, it was a popular device - after all, once
something has been labeled ‘natural’ it is very hard to oppose or reject it… It
has been said that the word ‘natural’ was a central concept in Enlightenment
thinking.
Using evidence from the writings
of travellers and naturalists such as Buffon, he explores the nature
of man: natural man would be roving
individuals; there would be no permanent relationships, but a "loose
companionship"; there would be no love, no family, no morality, and no
property; people would be free, but without knowledge, language, morality, or
industry – they would be neither moral nor vicious: in a word – “innocent”. (Berki)
For
Rousseau, then, the ‘savage’ in the state of nature was not selfish (as in
Hobbes) nor even rational (as in Locke) – for these abilities, he argued, arose
as a result of our interaction with others, and especially in ‘civilisation’.
For
Hobbes, in the 17th century, the state of nature was one in which
life was ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ – and in the state of
nature (since there were no laws to restrain people) men would be constantly
competing with each other (a ‘war of all against all’). For Locke, (also in the
17th century, but more influential on the Enlightenment thinkers) on
the other hand, since men were rational, the state of nature was simply lacking
in ways of enforcing what the majority of people regarded as right (especially
the right to ‘life, liberty and property’).
Hence
the idea (not exactly what Rousseau was saying) of the noble savage. In this, Rousseau was a precursor of the ‘romantics’
(Wordsworth and others) of the early 19th century: he also loved
“nature” and wrote a book about his walks, and his dreaming as he walked
through the countryside. He admired the newly “discovered” native peoples,
whose lives were described by travellers, as he believed they led more natural
lives than the civilised French. In retort, Voltaire sarcastically said that
Rousseau's praise of the "noble savage" was so convincing that it
made him want to get down on all fours.
Rousseau’s view of human nature
(before society changes it) is that we all have two natural (pre-social)
sentiments or feelings (sensibilité).
Again, and most importantly, unlike the other Enlightenment thinkers, Rousseau does
not attribute reasoning powers to us as ‘natural’ or pre-social… We have feelings first, and he identifies two
such sentiments/feelings: amour de soi, and
pitié:
- amour de soi – [love of oneself] is not the
same as amour-propre, [self-love]: self-love
develops in society, especially after the institution of property… and it is
the basis of false values such as "honour", pride and vanity...
Rather amour de soi could be self-respect
or self-preservation. Simply: the desire
to satisfy our own short-term needs – and presumably not to be hurt.
- pitié – [pity] but probably best
translated as sympathy or compassion. Pitié
is not the same as altruism, but rather the desire not to hurt others.
For Himmelfarb Rousseau’s
account, in Emile, of how the central character develops ‘social feelings’ is
that these feelings are based on self-love (because self-love comes first in
human development): “When the strength of an expansive soul makes me identify
myself with my fellow, and I feel that I am, so to speak, in him, it is in
order not to suffer that I do not want him to suffer. I am interested in him
for love of myself (l’amour de moi).” And this is also the ‘source of [a sense
of?] justice’: “Love of men derived from love of self is the principle of human
justice.”
I have two comments on
Himmelfarb’s implied position here (she is contrasting Rousseau with other
writers who posit an inherent social feeling): first that Rousseau’s
formulation seems to me very close to the ‘golden rule’: Do unto others as you
would wish them to do unto you (or: love others as you love yourself…). Second, that Rousseau is describing a process
of evolution or development, and in this he surely is right: a child is
self-centred before becoming other-oriented.
However, as we will see with
Smith and Hutcheson there were others who were more ready to attribute to
social feelings to human nature. [Note that there is common ground between
Rousseau and Adam Smith on ‘pity’ or compassion (see next week) – Smith may
have got the idea from Rousseau’s 1755 Discourse on Inequality, which he
reviewed three years before his Theory of moral Sentiments was published. The
latter may in turn have influenced Rousseau when he wrote Emile (1758)].
4. Women:
Rousseau
had a controversial view of the role of women
– in fact he saw them as a threat to public order, because they do not have
men’s rationality!! Men would be active in public affairs, i.e. politics,
whilst women brought up the children.
Yet he gave women an important
role in the home, bringing up children with a sense of responsibility,
morality, duty etc, which underpins the civic virtues... This idea was seen by
many women of the time as progressive. Perhaps part of its appeal was the
importance Rousseau put on "natural" feelings. But it did mean that
woman would have a separate role, and not be allowed to take part in public
life… Contemporary feminist writers such as Carol Pateman have little time for
Rousseau.
5. Society, inequality, war:
Society,
whilst it brings benefits, such as mutual protection, also corrupts us – the
main corrupting factors being: inequality (springing from private property),
luxury, idleness and a (false) political constitution. War also originates from
the idea of private property…
An
interesting corollary of this argument is that language, reasoning, culture and
morality all originate with society.
The important point to note at
this stage is how Rousseau differed from other Enlightenment thinkers in his
emphasis on feelings, and on the negative aspects of social conditioning; I
would also stress that collective solidarity (the basis of social and political
organisation) which is based on feelings would be very different from
organizing on the basis of reason. We surely have to use both our feelings and
our reason: although social feelings, and especially compassion, would bind a
people together – whilst reason seems unlikely to promote social solidarity…
also there is no guarantee that the feelings promoted would be positive:
patriotism etc have to be kept in check.
6. On religion: [Mainly from ‘Rousseau’ by Robert Wokler (Oxford Past Masters series,
1995), Chapter 5].
Rousseau supported religion
and religious tolerance. Theological intolerance would have sinister political
consequences (letter to Voltaire on
In the second part of his
Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar he assails ‘the bigotry and
superstition above all of Roman Catholicism’ and criticises religion as
revelation. (p 83)
In his later years he
supported religious piety, because
it was based on emotion rather than
being intellectual.
Rousseau’s position, then,
was in contrast to John Locke, Shaftesbury and others, who had ‘sketched out
ways in which God was restrained by reason’ (O’Hara p 139). Locke had answered
the question facing the materialists (following Descartes) as to how matter could
think: God could make matter think.
Although Locke had denied
innate ideas, he argued that God must exist in order for us to make sense of
the world. With regard to revelation, Locke said that it might go beyond reason
(and may come from God), but it could not be contrary to reason.
Rousseau attacked this idea
(in the Profession…) as a ‘veritable absurdity’ - he felt that his own sense of
his own existence cannot be generated by unorganized matter; we must be more than mere matter, we have
the capacity for a spontaneous expression of will.
On Christianity, in The Social Contract Rousseau argues that,
historically, Christians were originally other-worldly; then, although their
faith was spread by the
Everywhere, in Rousseau’s
time, religion and politics were separate and either religion controlled
politics or vice versa (the latter in
Rousseau, however, argued
that religious and secular power should be in the same hands, (as had Hobbes) but
he also noted the danger of the ruler upholding his own interests rather than
those of the state (and he criticised Hobbes for failing to see this danger).
He also said that Christianity was not the best religion to support political
order – Christians would be more concerned with saving their souls than
defending the republic. For Rousseau: ‘true Christians are made to be
slaves.’
Rousseau follows Plato, and
Machiavelli especially, in advocating a civil function for religion.
He was passionate about
religion, but his views changed through his life: he wrote prayers as a young
man when ‘under the Catholic influence of Mme de Warens’, he wrote a defence of
his Protestant faith in Letters from the Mountains, - he was a ‘child of the
Reformation’ according to Wokler (p 81) - but he also described a ‘natural
religion’ in his Rêveries.
This was one reason he
opposed the scepticism and materialism of his contemporary philosophes.
We do not, he said, need any
of the Holy Books (Bible, Torah, Koran), but we need only consult nature and
our inner feelings. ‘I perceive God everywhere in His works… I sense Him in
me.’
7. Politics:
The
opening words of his best-known writing on politics, The Social Contract 1762,
had a tremendous appeal in the run-up to the French Revolution: "Man is born free, and
everywhere he is in chains. One believes himself the master of others, and yet
he is a greater slave than they…”
He
argued that what was needed was a new social contract – one based on the need
for each citizen to consider the ‘general
will’ (a kind of collective consciousness, an agreement as to what is best
for the whole society).
Himmelfarb’s
view on this was quoted above (section 1), and she contrasts Rousseau’s
position with that of, say, Francis Hutcheson (1694 – 1746, author of A System
of Moral Philosophy) who, when he ‘spoke of the ‘greatest happiness of the
greatest numbers’ … meant this in the most prosaic, quantitative sense.’
Many
liberal critics have underlined his (unfortunate?) statement that individuals
must agree with the general will as it is by definition for the good of all. If
they do disagree, they must be ‘forced to be free’…
In
this, as in the other ways indicated, Rousseau was an atypical Enlightenment
thinker!
Rousseau ‘should perhaps have
been less surprised than he was’ (says Wokler) that his views were not welcomed
– his work was proscribed in Geneva, and the Archbishop of Paris denounced him,
the Sorbonne and the Parlement
likewise, ordering ‘Emile’ to be burned by the public executioner!
His books (Emile and the
Social Contract) were also ordered to be burned in
This defence of freedom later
inspired Hegel and others ‘drawn to a God manifest in nature’ (cf. also
Spinoza).
His
ideas were incredibly influential during the eighteenth century, especially in
What worried the church – and
the state – was that Rousseau was arguing against any intermediary body between
the citizen and God, on the one hand, or between the citizen and the government
on the other hand. Wokler puts it (p 90): ‘freedom
of conscience required an unmediated God no less than did legislative freedom
of assembly require an unrepresented sovereign.’ [i.e. direct democracy].
References:
Jones,
W.T. (ed): Masters of Political Thought, 1980, Harrap
Wokler, Robert: ‘Rousseau’ - Oxford
Past Masters series, Oxford UP, 1995